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reasons, as well as for the technological parity which is now evidenced,
and the ability of the USSR to equalize our present quantitative advantage
by about 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe strongly that under no
circumstances should the United States discuss with the USSR a test
moratorium prior to the successful completion of the key shots in
HARDTACK,
radical advances in weapon systems are onlypossibie throughthese immew
ow
owe
eee
EET
ETS
E
Tete
e
cece
tence
cence
eee
eg eS ee
Bt
ves
TE nH Yee
provements, Pe EEE
ESE
SUE EEE
EEE:
eeeeesn eae ae
eee
.
SITE Ree bee eee
cane rec ccetratasaamaeancanman
nme
JIE EEE LEY
Significant advancements —
in such weapon systems as the second generation of IRBM's, ICBM's, and
“es
a
1
Sig tae >
Tee
Fn
erste
1E”
i
5. Only through continued testing and development can improvements
be realized in yield-to-weight ratios for atomic warheads. Further,
ce
‘
FBM's and the anti-missile missile are only possible through continued
warhead development and testing. In addition, vital weapon effects information can only be obtained through continued testing,
6. For the reasons above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmtheir
opinion of 31 December 1957 that cessation of tests should be consiere
only as a part of a larger disarmament proposal which will provide
also
nye eee
phe tn
for complete suspension of the production of weapons and weapons
ties
materials keyed to an effective system of inspection and verification.
me ROY hy arog bibs. oa
aa
eR
ws
wt “4 +.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
(Signed)
MAXWELL D, TAYLOR
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff
weeT
Enclosure:
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Appendix