that if the missile got out of control areas, most prominently the Hawaiian it could reach a number of inhabited Islands. There is also the emotional advantage of a short range missile that the time from launch to detonation would be so short that. those in control would not be able to make any Ahi ale Ly decisions, hence teleaving-jhem from the responsibility. The Navy offered the Polaris missite which could be launched from the surface ship otxtneQservation Te land vine hence could carry whatever RV we built to fit it without submarine launch considerations. This offer had the advantage that the launch site was already built; however, the observation island had some time restrictions on it. guess we'd better find out. we'd better check that. The reasons I've forgotten and | I'm not even sure the name Observation Island-- It did appear that cooperation between the task force, the rv builder and the Navy would be difficult. And, a sea based alf the rest of the instrumentation on Johnston Island launch with led to some hesitation on the part of the task force. Nik@ Hercules did not have the range for most of the shots proposed nor could it carry the warheads desired. Furthermore, it appeared that it would be difficult to put in all of the destruct features. When these considerations were first entered into in the fall of I961, the Air Force had put aside some half-dozen Thor missiles for possible task force use. However, as time went on and the task force began to look favorably also on the Polaris missile, the Air Force released these particular Thors. In spite of this, the Air Force and their contractor, Douglass, were most enthusiastic and convincing in their Cescriptions7 Lab perse of the Thor missile. tc Laced They, Ate had done their homework well, hancdetretemc/ the schedules required for the~zg of the launch site on Johnston Island and the required changes in the missile. (| forgot to mention that one of the considerations of the missile was that it f. Cw“? J