Wersgall Nevertheless, the AEC declared that Bikini was safe. ‘“There is virtually no radiation left,’ one AEC official stared in 1969, “and we can find no discernible effect on plant or animal life."’ A Complete Failure In 1969 the first Bikinians returned to their atol! ro assist in the resettlement project. The Department of the Interior (DOI) began construction on 40 homes. Bikini Island and Eneu, a nearby island. were bulldozed, and the topsoil was turned over to reduce radiation. By the end of the year. 50,000 new trees were planted on the islands. All signs pointed to a happy ending for the Bikinians. In 1971 the director of the AEC’s Division of Operational Safety reported that numerous well water samples had been taken from several locations on Bikini Island and that, ‘from a radiological viewpoint, the water is safe to drink.��’ In late 1973 the United States announced that construction on Bikini was nearly complete. and thar ‘‘if all is acceptable to the people. the trust territory government is prepared to allow them fo re- turn to Bikini Atoll permanently by Christ- mas this year.” As the Bikinians began to return to their atoll, however, DOI recognized that a new. more thorough. radiological survey of Bikini was needed. In 1972 the AEC had made such a survey of Enewetak, a Marshallese atoll also used as a nuclear test site. Instruments used in the Enewetak survey, such as airborne sensors, were far more sensitive and accurate than the equipment used to conduct the 1967 survey of Bikini. The Enewetak survey was the starting point of a massive cleanup by the U.S. government. and most of the Enewetakese now are being resettled in the southern Rogers C. B. Morton, alarmedby the findings of routine, unsophisticated radiological surveys, haleed construction on Bikini Island. He wrote to Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger several monrhs later, in March 1975, to request that a thorough survey be conducted on Bikini, warning that ‘‘despite assurances that the atoll is safe. the attitudes and fears of the people are being influenced by various outside groups, many of whom are critics of the nuclear program.”’ In order to ‘avoid... the loss of our credibility” with the Bikinians, Morton concluded, ‘‘we must answer the critics.”’ The Interior Department needed the Defense Department's (DOD) logistical support for the survey. for neither Interior nor the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA}—successor to the AEC and precursor to the Department of Energy (DOE}—had the logistical capabilicy or the money to conduct the survey. But although Morton's letter said that ERDA was prepared to conduct a radiological survey in April. DOD did not even respond until the end of May. when it stated that it could conduct the survey at a ‘reimbursable cost’ of $609.- 000. Since Interior had no funds for reim- bursement. Defense declined to take on the task. DO! tried again in June. Interior bluntly stated in a letter thac it was “‘deeply con- cerned that a quality radiological survey such as that performed on Enewetak. whose people will not be coming back for some time. cannot be made available in a timely fashion for the Bikinians whose return is imminenr.’’ Warning that “none of the involved departments has budgeted adequately for this needed and highly warranted efforr in order to meet our statutory and moral commitmentsto the peo- part of their atoll, which was left relatively free of contamination by the tests. A debate simmers, however, over whether to permit resettlement of Enjebi, an island in the north whose radiation levels exceed federal standards. In late 1974, Secrerary of the Interior ple of this area."’ the letter concluded that the United States required ‘’a strong reafirmation by all concerned agencies to work together in carrying out a comprehensive program.” But 86. 87. no survey was conducted. Meanwhile. some Bikinians had expressed a desire to build homes in the interior of the