indicator RUHPJ. In working with RJHF the routing indicator RJHPBH was used, while in working with RJHK the indicator was RJHKN. ‘lYi- butaries serving Air Force activities had routing indicators derived fron RJHKN, while tributaries serving Army, Navy and AEC activities used routing indicators derived frcm RUHPJ. This situation inmensely complicated the problen of training operators, and contributed directly to a number of instances of misdirected, delayed, duplicated or undelivered nessagos. The arrangement described above was said to be nece~sary in order to operate within the Air Force network using predetermined routing, and to permit access to the on-line facilities of the SAC Connand net. It was found that the supposed advantages of this system did not exist,. A simpler and much superior systen would have evolved fron the use of a singleservice routing indicator, preferably Ar~ since the najority of operational traffic used Army routing. All tributaries including Air Force should have been given routing indicators derived from the same base. Designation of the relay center as an intersemice transfer point would then kve allowed complete freedom in the routing of traffic over the facilities of either service. g. The SAMSON network proved to be a disappointment. Ili- rect on-line handling was possible to a large number of addresses; however, little traffic developed for these points. ~isa consequence, traffic records for the month of May 1956 showed that only 1% of all traffic handled over the five SAMSON channels was llonlineltclassified. Tl@orilyadmntage ga.inadwas inx2fYlcazml@is protection. This gain was offset as the task force administrative traffic, extienely heavy in volume and following the 82 -.— .&-A-- ..ti& -... ..-__ _