SECTION VII - COMIN’NIC.~TIONS: 1. General r a. Following the roll-up of Operation CASTLE, communication activi+y decreased to a low level; a reflection of the general inactivity in the Pacific Proving Ground. Through attrition and lack of replacements, personnel strength of the Signal Detachment fell to about forty-five, only slightly nore tkn half that authorized by the . interim table of distribution. This condition continued until the start of the build-up for Operation REDWNG. b. Principally because of the personnel shortage, communica- tion operations were quite inefficient. %intmmnce of installed equip.. ment was inadequp%, resulting in serious deterioration. Other equipment which had been returned to local stock following CASTLE and which was need of overhaul had to be left in its condition of unknown ser- viceability. During the period of minimum personnel, communication center operations were reduced to sixteen hews per day. c. - and ilirForce communication operations remained in- dependent during the interim period. The 1253d AACS Squadron mintcinsd radio receiver station and teletype center in Building 89, wherein were operated a radio-teletype multiplex circuit to KWAJAEIN, a weather intercept receiving teletype from GUAM, and a point-to-point airways CW and voice circuit working with KWAJALEIN and BIKINI. TG 7.2 maintained a receiver station in Building 85, wherein were operated a radioteletype circuit to Hawaii and the Harbor Common CW and voice circuits. The TG 7.2 Coma Center, which provided teletype relay service to AACS and to PARRY Island, was located in the Headquarters,