should always control the communication center which seines it. 19. @erience in this operation indi~ted the impossibility of operating a supply depot large enough to supply the unprogrammed needs of the entire task force for communication-elect~nics equipment. Attempts to perform this function led to an intolerable situation wherein excesses existed of unwanted items, and real requircments were not met. 20. The arrangements under which part of the equipment in the Joint Communication Facilities was provided by and accounted for by the Air Force and part by the Army led to a real difficulty in coordinating maintenance support and replacement factors~ 21. Considerable and expensive the was lost during the interim and byild-up stages by persomel travel to and from weather island sites via KWAJA131N where the only available amphibious type aircraft were based~ 22. The TG 7.2 Transportation Officer as Deputy Port Commander acted as the NSTS representative for ships entering the ENIWETOK ?ort. The authority for actions taken, however, were rmt defined in available directives. 23. relative Data on landing areas and other survey type information certain other atolls and islands scheduled for use as scientific and weather stations was not available. Such surveys kd to be nwde during the extreme last portionof the build-~p periods in coordination with TG ?.S, in a rather hasty and thereby possib~ inexact manner. 2h. Port operation responsibility was assumed by (YI’G 703 dur@ 127