wl
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(a)
Desirability of expanding the operational Atlas
force,
(b)
Is it possible to accelerate base acquisition,
personnel training, GSE procurement, and funding
cycle to warrant an increased rate of missile
production?
(2)
(c)
Desirability of installing Atlas squadrons 1 through 4
in hardened sites (loo psi} and the desirability of
hardening Atlas squadrons 5 through 9 to 100 psi
rather than to 25 psi as now planned.
(d)
Is it possible to have a higher missile per launche
ratio -- particularly during the early period when
the U.S. is base-limited and the enemy's accuracy
is poorest ?
Are the estimated accuracies for second generation missiles
{i.e., CEP of 1/2 mile at 5500 n.m.) justified on the basis
of reliability and other factors?
And, if not, is this likely
to lead to erroneous conclusions concerning our strategic
military requirements in the 1965 - 1970 time period?
(3)
Solid propellants: There is a requirement for priority
(4)
Hawaii Tracking Station.
among programs requiring solid propellants since there
appears to be a saturation of industries participating in
the solid propellant development program.
(a)
Problems created for the Air Force and NASA
programs by the transfer of the Hawaiian tracking
station to the Navy as part of the Pacific Missile
Test Range,
NAVEEN Ol Cl
(b)
Immediate importance of assuring adequate
instrumentation for JUNO firing in April since
this critical station is to be transferred March l,
and thereafter modified by the Navy. (This
question had not been discussed with Dr. Glennan
when he visited STL}.
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