By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallese body levels were above the maximum permissible dose and the Bikinians were evacuated again. a Conard and representatives of other (eft) People walking on the concrete dome covering an atomic bomb crater on Runit Island, Enewetak atoll. (below) Nuclear clean up on Runit Island. deft) U.S. Army personnel in full protective year. (right) Army personnel mixing plutonium-conisininated soil with cement to form the massive concrete dome. Robert Conard of Brookhaven National Laboratory—which has coordinated the Marshall Islands medical program since 1954—estimated the health risks of the exposure: wee oe EE ahi ieahiadieiiiidaieCanal ~ , pa ‘ acm 7 ~ , et ‘ 4 J x . ~> “aut we: Oo, se a7 ‘y - “ a 4 4 (ON ; z ‘*Assuming that they [143 people] had all been there since 1970 and received the average estimated integrated total douse of 2.6 rems for the period. based on known radiationinduced risk data. one would expect only about 0.008 total cases of leukemia to develop in that population as a result of their radiation ex- posure. The need for further medical examinations is not indicated based on possible radiation effects as- sociated with such low doses.’"!'4 But Dr. Konrad Kotrady, a former Brookhaven resident physician in the Marshalls. strongly disagreed with this philosophy: U.S. government agencies. in apologizing for the complications which occurred. frequently say that radiation measurement techniques then were not as sophisticated as those available today: that the surveys of Bikini were far less extensive than those subsequently carried out at Enewetak atoll.'® The facts. however, suggest otherwise. In 1972-1973, the United States conducted an ‘exhaustive radiologcal survey of Enewetak,”” which included both ground and aerial sur- veys of the islands, according to the Department of Energy. It was not done at Bikini, however. In fact, it wasn't until the Bikinians nled a federal law suit in 1975. asking for a thorough radiological survey of Bikint and the northern Marshall [slands, that the government agreed to do it. But because of three years of bureaucratic infighting among the Departments of Energy, State and Interior, the radiological survey was not conducted until after the evacu- ation of Bikini in late 1978. The United States did have sophisticated techniques for measuring radiation at the outset of the Bikini resettlement; it chose to employ them only at Enewetak. U.S. policies with respect to pro- tecting the health of the Marshallese have been totally inconsistent. For example, in 1946, prior to the first radiation can cause. . . and then tell the people a medical programis unnecessary. If in 40 or SO years medical problems do occur as a resuit of the exposure, it would be better if a well designed medical prozraum was Wreadsy i progress to detect the problems."7'* nuclear test series. Operation Crossroads, the people from islands within a radius of 300 miles of Bikini— including the Rongelap—were evacuated as a safety precaution.!’ The yield of these bombs was approximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954, there was no official warning of the Bravo test. much fess an evacuation of the populations. Yet Bravo was the largest U.S. hydroven bomb tested—more than [5 megatons. More than 200 Marshallese on December [980 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27 ‘*The people fail to understand howscientists can sav they do not knowall the possible late effects the