\ ~16hm . gnhoWe, . %, ress S t and high enough to prevent the second? Theoretically at least, there may be such\& leve ~ Our ouppose that each of the great states and also powers capable of independent production of the bomb wore permitted to keep a small supply of bombs. The total number of bombs permitted to exist should perhaps be not much greater than that calculated to be sufficient to bring about the capitulation of the greatest state, The number of bombs permitted to any one state would therefore be very mich less than that sufficient to bring about such a capitulation. The munber of bombs beyond the control of any given state would on the other hand be such that that state would pay dearly for an attempted aggression in terms of the devastation of its territories and might even be almost totally destroyed. 41 In. this situation, the effectiveness of the retaliatory sanction would be preserved, Such a situation of drastic atomic arms limitation would require detailed and close inspection of national armaments under the supervision of the United Nations Organization. Inspection would not, however, be the only safeguard. Discovery of a violation of the limitation agreement would not mean that all was already lost. Such a discovery would be the signal for a general atomic re- armament and for political action to enforce compliance bythe offending state. Long experience with detailed and close inspection for enforcement of atomic arms limitation agreements might ultimately permit such great confidence to be placed in the efficacy or inspection that the complete abolition of atomic armaments would become possible, This third stage of atomic arms regula- tion is clearly not for our own dacade, Whether and how soon it will become politically feasible is not for this writer to say. ee a ru 7 38 lit. a a 7" af 3 a + B40Ok aw an we 3 One possible objection to a proposal of this character is that it might render even more difficult the inspection problem, The enforcement of a particular distribution of atomic weapons might require a more detailed inspection than the enforcement of an agreement which forbade totally the possession or production of atomic bombs.