‘,

-158-

\

national collaboration, when and if they are convinced of its desirability and of
the public demand for it, the necessity for building up an informed public
opinion on questions of atomic energy control policy Pesan apparent.
2,

Our discussion of world government and of the pdticy of uli revelation
leads to the conclusion that one wing of public opiniomng ds to be'educated as
to the very narrow limits within which international action to control the bomb
now seems possible.

The Vandenberg-Austin wing, on the other hand, needs even

more to be made to understand the very moderate character of the steps now being

taken.

It may be unfair to denounce them as recklessly bold.

In a country in

|

which each step in foreign relations has to be considered in the light of both
domestic and foreign repercussions, it is not enough for high policy-makers to
know what is right.
is right.

They need support from an electorate which also knows what

There can be no substitute for an understanding public opinion if

American officials are to have the freedom and the guidance which they need.
they do not have this home front support, they will surely fail.

If

The time is

short in which to develop it.
HHH EHH MH
Even though it seems prcbable that the scope of the agreements immediately
forthcoming on matters connected with atomic energy will be very modest, it is
not too soon to begin speculating on the nature of a successful long-term atomic
energy control policy.
There is general agreement regarding the long-term control objectives only
on two points.

Control is to be established step by step.

to be an inspection system.

Eventually, there is

Beyond these two points, a long-term control pro-

gram, to be successful, must be based on the following considerations.

1.

The control problem is inseparable from the general problem of relations

among the great powers. It is most intimately related of course to Soviet~
American relations.

No serious consideration therefore should be given to types

of solutions which stand no chance of being accepted by either the United States

Select target paragraph3