\ =12opportunities for world dominance would be breath-taking. Hence we come to the paradox that the further we go by international agreement in the direction of eliminating bombs and installations, the stronger becomes the temptation to evade the agreement} The feeling of security which one imagines would come from a bombless world would seem to be a fleeting one, This suggests that the basic problem is somewhat different from that of just getting rid of bombs, It is rather a question of how to reduce to the lowest possible minimum the potential advantages to be gained by a successful evasion of a limitation agreement, If the threat to security comes from the prize that is available to a violator of a treaty, then the sensible thing to co would be to take away the value of the prize. Obviously this would not be an easy thing aN ‘mgst ? adventures in atomic warfare that could be devised, bad ny It happens that the atomic bomb is one of th adaped to the technique of retaliation, ke, vo. e~ is atomic energy itself, poe to do, but one has at hand a new and powerful aid for accomplishing it and that persuasive deterrents to It is peculiarly well One must assume that, so long as bombs exist at all, the states possessing them will hold themselves in readiness at all times for instant retaliation on the fullest possible scale in the event of an atomic attack, The result would be that any potential violator of a limitation agreement would have the terrifying contemplation that not only would he lose his cities immediately on starting an attack, but that his transportation and communication systems would doubtless be gone and his industrial capacity for producing the materials of war would be ruined, -If in spite of all this he still succeeded in winning the war, he would find that he had conquered nothing but a blackened ruin, The prize for his violation of his agreement would be ashes! Hence there does seem to be available a safeguard strong enough to act as a real deterrent against possible cvasion of a limitation agreement, But it is /é