\ \ ~-152~ such an agreement will achieve no radical disturbance of the present power pat- tern. If, for example, nations agreed to forego the ri bombs at all, then a single nation which violated th Sagrecngnt could enforce its will against those which had acted in good faith. or limit drastically the possession of bombs or of atomic energy installations would have to be accompanied by provisions for close inspection, Is an inspection scheme really feasible? ali states had full confidence, in all countries, It would have to be one in which It would have to work with equal effectiveness Previous experience with international attempts to regulate the narcotics traffic domonstates the feasibility of detecting many violations of such an international agreement. However, that particular inspection schene has never been one hundred per cent effective. Jt has hardly been effective at all against violations committed with the tacit approval of national authorities. It has certainly not been effective to the degree necessary to justify a nation in placing sole reliance upon a similar inspection system for the control of atomic energy production.” 206 - See L. BE. C. Eisenlohr, International Narcotics Control, London, Allen and Umvin, 1934, In the applicebility of the experience in controlling the traffic in narcotic drugs to the problems of inspection and regulation of the arms traffic in general, sec "Analogies betyeen the Problem of the Traffic in Narcotic Drags and That of the Trade in and Manufacture of Arms," League of Nations, Dis- armament Section, Conference for the Reduction and Linitation of Armaments, Con- ference Documents, II, 9-502 (League of Nations Docunent IX, Disarmament.” 1935. IX. 4). This analysis prepared in the League secretariat for the use of the Conference points to the great differences in the two problems, since in the case of narcotics it is private illicit traffic which the agreement sccks to suppress and in the case of arms production it is action taken "with the active or passive complicity of the Government" which is most likely to constitute a vio lation of the agreement, See also "Chemical, Incendiary and Bacterial Weapons: Reply to the Questionnaire Submitted by the Bureau to the Special Committee," ibid., 4b8-72. Some of the conclusions there reached regarding the impractica- bility of prohibiting the manufacture, import, oxport or possession of inmple-. ments or substances capable of both pacific and military utilization apply with even greater force to prohibitions in atomic energy production, Other concluSions also suggest the extent to which discussion of atomic onergy control is traversing anew ground already covered in considering previously knowm "instru-~ ments of mass destruction," e.g.: "The more highly the chemical industry is developed, the less would production in war time be delayed by a prohibition of the manufacture of the compounds exclusively suitable for chemical warfare (p. sh). "The prohibition of preparations for chemical warfare must not hinder