\ -107unbridled Soviet-American armament race which will further strain and poison re~ lations between the two.countries, Whether this is likely to happen depends to some extent on the meaning we give to the term "unbridled armament race," If all it is supposed to indicate is a situation in which the Russians are influenced in their armament policy by the state of American military power and vice versa, then we are engaged in such an armament race already. Nobody could maintain that Russian efforts to produce atomic weapons—or a big navy for that matter—~are dictated solely by anxieties regarding Germany, Japan, or even Great, Britain. Similarly, our preparedness is obviously not being decided without consideration for our security from Russian attack.’ The-policy of each country in regard to atomic power will certainly follow the same line, without necessarily harming the relations between the two countries. eT t forrrns. 3 “_ a ft would be a different matter if the U.S.A. and the U.S.S5.R. were to become ~ out engaged in a competitive strugge for arms superiority of the kind that developed between the European powers in the years immediatcly preceding the two world wars. There is no reason why dual possession of the bomb should:produce a situation so obviously fraught with danger. Arms races of that type have in the past been the result not of new and powerful weapons but of a deterioration of relations between nations which led them to expect an carly outbreak of hostilities. If Soviet- American rclations were ever allowed to degenerate to a state of enmity, an unbridled armament race would follow as a consequence, Such a race would not be limited to a struggle for more and better atomic weapons, altnough that might become its most spectacular aspect. As a matter of fact, it was show earlicr!+ that an atomic race after reaching ea certain point offers relatively modest military advantages, Instead, major benefits might be found along such lines as the greater dispersion of targets or the alignment with more and stronger allies. c (i. See above, Fo. 36-28. While armaments of the kind which both countries are