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country, So averse to war anyway, will show greater reluctance to take up arms

against the Russians once they possess the means of destroying our cities,
This is particularly true since our disputes with the Soviet Union are likely to center around Russian claims or moves concerning regions far removed from
the United States.

Like Britain in 1938, this country might become hesitant to

risk for the settlement of troubles in "faraway places" not merely war but the
very existence of its urban populations,

If American security and world peace

should at amy time require that the spread of Russian influence or control be
checked in such regions, excessive American fear of the atom bomb might seriously
interfere with our peace strategy.

Those who would spread panic at the mere

thought of atomic warfare must realize that they might undermine the influence
for peace and world order which this country now possesses,

The mere

suspicion

on the part of the nations of Europe and Asia that the United States had become
intimidated by Russian atomic power and could therefore no longer be counted upon
for protection might lead then to bow more willinglytoSéviet demands, . Nobody
would want this country to assume unnecessary riskdof,depbmuction; but it would
not serve peace if one of the major powers of the world were paralyzed by fear
and thus diverted from the course which it would otherwise have pursued.

If it were asked why Russian foreign policy is not being equally weakened
today when we alone have atomic bombs, the answer is that she has several advantages which we do not possess.

We have already mentioned the fact that the

Russian people may be far less aware of the danger.

But even if theywere, the

Soviet system of government allows far less scope for the pressure of public
opinion with the result that the apprehensions of the Russian people may exercise

no marked influence on Soviet foreign policy,

Furthermore, the international

Situation of the two countries differs in such a way that the question of whether
to appease the United States may never arise in Moscow.

The Soviet Union, as

recent events have demonstrated, is far less satisfied with the existing status
quo than is the United States,

If unilateral action to change the status quo

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