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and high enough to prevent the second?
Theoretically at least, there may be such\& leve ~
Our
ouppose that each of
the great states and also powers capable of independent production of the bomb
wore permitted to keep a small supply of bombs.
The total number of bombs
permitted to exist should perhaps be not much greater than that calculated to be
sufficient to bring about the capitulation of the greatest state,
The number of
bombs permitted to any one state would therefore be very mich less than that
sufficient to bring about such a capitulation.
The munber of bombs beyond the
control of any given state would on the other hand be such that that state
would pay dearly for an attempted aggression in terms of the devastation of its
territories and might even be almost totally destroyed. 41
In. this situation,
the effectiveness of the retaliatory sanction would be preserved,
Such a situation of drastic atomic arms limitation would require detailed
and close inspection of national armaments under the supervision of the United
Nations Organization.
Inspection would not, however, be the only safeguard.
Discovery of a violation of the limitation agreement would not mean that all was
already lost.
Such a discovery would be the signal for a general atomic re-
armament and for political action to enforce compliance bythe offending state.
Long experience with detailed and close inspection for enforcement of
atomic arms limitation agreements might ultimately permit such great confidence
to be placed in the efficacy or inspection that the complete abolition of
atomic armaments would become possible,
This third stage of atomic arms regula-
tion is clearly not for our own dacade,
Whether and how soon it will become
politically feasible is not for this writer to say.
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One possible objection to a proposal of this character is that it might
render even more difficult the inspection problem, The enforcement of a particular distribution of atomic weapons might require a more detailed inspection
than the enforcement of an agreement which forbade totally the possession or
production of atomic bombs.