By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallese
body levels were above the maximum permissible dose
and the Bikinians were evacuated again.
Conard and representatives of other
U.S. government agencies, in
apologizing for the complications
(eft) People walking o8 the
concrete dome coveriag as atomic bomb
crater on Roaii Island, Ensewetak
aioll. (below) Nociear clean ap of
Renit Isinad. (eft) U.S. Army
personae in fall protective gear,
(right) Army persoanei mixing
platoniam-cogtaminated soil with cement
to form the massive coacrete dome.
Robert Conard of Brookhaven
National Laboratory—which has
coordinated the Marshall Islands
medical
program
since
1954—
estimated the health msks of the exposure:
** Assuming that they [143 people]
had all been there since 1970 and re-
ceived the average estimated inte-
grated total dose of 2.6 rems for the
penod, based on known radiation-
induced msk data, one would expect
only about 0.005 total cases of
leukemia to develop in that population as a result of their radiation ex-
posure.
The need for further medical
which occurred, frequently say that
radiation measurement techniques
then were not as sophisticated as
those available today; that the surveys of Bikini were far less extensive
than those subsequently carned out
at Enewetakatoll.'® The facts. however, suggest otherwise.
In 1972-1973, the United States
conducted an “exhaustive radiologi-
cal survey of Enewetak.’* which included both ground and aenal sur-
veys of the islands. according to the
Department of Energy. It was not
done at Bikini. however. In fact, it
wasn't until the Bikiniansfiled a fed-
eral law suit in 1975, asking for a
thorough radiological survey of Bi-
kini and the northern Marshall Islands, that the government agreed to
do it. But because of three years of
bureaucratic infighting among the
Departments of Energy, State and
Interior, the radiological survey was
not conducted until afrer the evacu-
“ation of Bikini in late 1978.
examinations is not indicated based
The United States did have
sophisticated
techniques
for
sociated with such low doses.’*'*
the Bikini resettlement; it chose to
on possible radiation effects as-
But Dr. Konrad Kotrady, a former
Brookhaven resident physician in
the Marshalls, strongly disagreed
with this philosophy:
**The people fail to understand
how scientists can say they do not
knowall the possible late effects the
radiation can cause. . . and then tell
the people a medical program is un-
necessary.
If in 40 or 50 years medical prob-
lems do occur as a result of the exposure, it would be better if a well
designed medical program was
already in progress to detect the
problems.’’'’
December !980
measuring radiation at the outset of
employ them only at Enewetak.
U.S. policies with respect to pro-
tecting the health of the Marshallese
have been totally inconsistent. For
example, in 1946, pnor to the first
nuclear test senes, Operation Cross-
roads. the people from islands within
a radius of 300 miles of Bikini—
including
the
Rongelap—were
evacuated as a safety precaution.'’
The yield of these bombs was approximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954,
there was no official warning of the
Bravo test, much less an evacuation
of the populations. Yet Bravo was
the largest U.S. hydrogen bomb
tested—more than 15 megatons.
More than 200 Marshailese on
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27