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Director, Division of Operationat ~:~
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Department of Energy
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The Northern Marshall Islands Advisory Group met on October 3-4, 1978 to consider the issue of planting coconuts on Enewetak Atoll, recommend
cleanup guidance for subsurface contamination, discuss the Enjebi experimental
farm, review preliminary results of the plowing experiment and be briefed
by Tommy McCraw on the status of the Northern Marshall Islands Survey.
The Advisory Group offers the following comments:
1.
Planting of Coconut Trees on Northern Islands of Enewetak
2.
A final decision concerning the permissible degree of occupancy
of the northern islands can be made only after conclusion. of
the present cleanup effort and after requisition of additional
information on applicable living habits and Food chains and
the movement of radionuclides (particularly 2°Sr and }37Cs)
through these food chains. Pending this evaluation it would
be unfortunate if steps were taken that would encourage the
Enewetak people to believe that a decision had already been
made, This is particularly cogent in view of the unfortunate
experience at Bikini. That experience suggests that coconuts ©
grown on the northern islands might not be suitable for human
consumption and might not be suitable for copra production.
To plant coconut trees on the northern islands at this time
might, therefore, require their early future destruction,
which would have unfortunate public relations repercussion.
Alternatively it might require restricting their consumption,
which the Bikini experience would indicate to be ineffective.
Cleanup Guidance for Subsurface Contamination
In some situations, such as those with the subsurface contamination
at Boken and Enjebi, it is not appropriate to apply a generic
plan such as the operation plan.
Instead, in situations as
well defined as these, it is better to rely on judgments
specific to these situations.
We would, therefore, recommend
that the identified pockets of contamination on Boken be
removed and that the contamination on Enjebi be left, unless ©
further definition of the subsurface pockets indicate pockets
exceeding 160 pCi/gm. Consideration should be given to removal
of the asphalt under the soil on Enjebi so that vegetation will grow.
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BEST COPY AVAILABLE
The Advisory Group concurs with the letter of September 9 to.
Vice Admiral R. R. Monroe from L. J. Deal.