~5ANNEX I
Objections to Testingto Develop Clean Weapons and Answers
Which May Serve as Justification for Further Tests
i.
The hasards of radioactivity are exaggerated.
Perhaps, but no one knows. Until we do, common sense
requires that we avoid such hasards if we can.
2.
Military needs for clean weapons are slight; they weigh
and are leas efficient in muclear material thanpresent weapons.
priority on their development?
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The military should recognize the limitations on the use| af
nuclear weapons now imposed by universal fear of all nuclear weapc ms.
Present clean weapon weight and efficiency limitations are tempora: ry
given further development. Which is worse, stop all development, er
accept some limitations which still permit extensive improvement’
3.
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Since clean weapons weigh more than dirty ones of equa!
yield, their use reduces our total destruction deliverable upon Rus
thereby reducing our deterrent and increasing the risk of war.
Deterrent is a frame of mind induced by estimates of r
tive
national capabilities and resolves. It is never a direct comparison of
deliverable megatons of destruction, particularly when neither side knows
the exact capabilities of the other.
The use of clean weapons in the larger sizes would not greatly
reduce our delivernble megatons even now, and less in the future w ith
further development. Only a few years ago dirty weapons weighed m ore
than present clean ones of equivalent yield. The deterrent policy w puld
not suffer now by promising to use clean weapons.
4.
By reducing radioactivity we reduce the deterrent and m ke
war more probable.
Ali-out war, no, because all-out nuclear war is unacce
ble
to both sides whether clean or dirty weapons are involved. All pa cipating
nations would probably die in either case. Deterrent to all-out war therefore remains, no matter what kind of mass destruction weapons maligne be
used.
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