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TABLE 3.4 SUMMARY OF FALLOUT DISTRIBUTION, FLATHEAD
Isodose
Area
wmr/br
mi?
0.2
0.1
Difference Area
Average
Contamination
mi?
wor/br
moc
383
383s
0.368
56
908
S25
6.148
31
3,350
2,442
0.074
73
0.037
115
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approximately 0.1 mr/br inside the detector shielding. The survey for this day could not detect
* any surface contamination reading above a miniinum detectable limit of 0.25 mr/brat 3 feet
from the surface. Table $3.4 summarizes the fallout distribution.
Ayevet ‘e US RE RA ‘
elosed, as far as aerial surveys on D +1 were concerned. As indicated on the chart, it was
not possible to close the isodose plot at that time.
—The project had four aircraft to choose from for the D + 2 flight, all reading a background of
o
Rane ee oe
Both aircraft on the D + 1 fights (Figure $3.11) were also lightly contaminated. Active fallout
was encountered 100 miles northwest of Bikin! at H «+ 30 bours. The northwest sector was
-
a ary
"y
asthe D4 1 survey does not indicate comparable dose rates. The aircraft encountered active
fallout and became contaminated. A replacement alrcraft was flown to the survey area. This
also became contaminated. At no time was the level in the aircraft allowed to exceed 20 mr/br.
De)
6.05
6.025
223,000°
7,650°
Vey, again because of a postponement. The aircraft flight, on the day which would have resulted
jo a D-1 survey, was not completed because of malfunction.
The background surveys were coordinated with a Project 2.62 ship survey. Because the
' Shape and position of the contaminated area varied from day to day, it is possible that the variation may have been a function of the surface winds. An outline of the area, based on the ship
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3.3.5 Shot Navajo. A background survey was made on D-1 day to determine Lf the bot intenSities, reposted by Project 2.62, adjacent to the reef after Shot Flathead, could have come from
Contaminated water crossing the reef. This flight (Figure $3.14) subsequently became a D-3
Survey because of postponement of the shot. The next Night (Figure 3.15) became the D—2 sur-
@ata has been included as Figure 3.16. The agreement between these plots appears good, in
wiew of the 12-hour displacement between the ship and aerial survey.
| The D-day survey (Figure 3.17) located the estimated upwind boundary. On D+1, the flights
"+ @overed an area of 10,000 mi’ but did not close the 0.025 mr/hr {sodose line in the northwest
The summary of the fallout distribution (Table 3.5) indicates considerable instability in the
Contaminated area during the aerial-survey operations. As experienced after the previous water
Sc
than estimated on the previous days. The narrow 1.25 mr/br line extending to the west of the
“>. , atoll had disappeared. Reef readings have been included in this chart.
Tek
. Sector (Figure 3.18). The D+2 chart (Figure 3.19) shows that this isodose extended farther
Ap
ings In mrsnr,'
3.3.4 Shot Mohawk. A survey of the islands of Ediwetok Atoll was flown on D+1. The island
readings are shown in Figure 3.12. The readings are referred to $ feet above the surface of the
islands by a factor of 5.8 for the 300-foot flight altitude (Figure 1 2). Sites Fred and Elmer were
excluded from the survey pattern, because a 300-foot flight altitude would have interfered with
the air traffic in the vicinity. The open-sea aerial survey could find no detectable contamination
in the area searched (Figure 3.13).
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The EOB is roughly estimated and may not be representative of the actual extent of the contamination.
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* Based on estimated position of isodose line.
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