weapons.
Greenhouse, which produced the largest atomic explosion to
that date, provided convincing proof of the soundness of Teller's design
for the hydrogen bamb.
So extensive and camplex were the logistics for
the Pacific test series that Greenhouse consumed the efforts of appreximately 6,000 military and civilian personnel, and 2,580 scientists and
technicians from the Commissicn.*4
Cammission scientists quickly analyzed the Greenhouse data.
To
coordinate the final drive for the hydrogen bamb the Cammission called a
conference at Princeton University in June 1951.
Meeting for two cays
the Cammissioners and key scientists discussed every aspect of the
thermonuclear program.
All agreed - "success was at last possible."
The scientists could embark on the last leg of the journey with a
feeling of confidence.
Yet the hydrogen bomb had caused bitter civi-
sions among scientists over both the ethics of building the fusion bard
and the resources which the thermonuclear program would cammanc ‘from
other priorities.
Never satisfied with the resources allocated to the
hydrogen bamb program, Edward Teller finally resigned from Los Alams in
September 1951.
He remained close to the program,
however,
as
a
consultant. +>.
The technical advances at Ranger and Greenhouse raised questicns
about the rete of the production of enriched uranium and plutonium.
The
rapid strides in developing fission weapons resulted in greater demancs
for both types of fissionable materials.
As the Commission consicerec
the issue, Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, asked the Commission "to estimate the cost of (a) increasing by 50 percent, (b) doubling, and (c) increasing by 150 percent cur
existing
and presently
planned
material and atomic bambs."
capacity
for
producing fissicrsble
So camplex were the issues involved
8
in