_. TOP SECKE.
they wished to exclude the USSR from any voice in the administration
of Antarctica and because they wished the United States, as soon as
possible, to claim both the unclaimed sector of Antarctica and areas
in sectors claimed by other nations in which we had rights and in-
terests. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the
minutes of the meeting, and another copy is attached to this memo-
randun. )
Upon conclusion of General Cutler's briefing he called upon
Secretary Dulles. The latter observed that the State Department supported the policy set forth in NSC 5804. Indeed, this policy had
largely been worked out by a representative of the Department of State
(Ambassador Daniels) in consultation with the other interested U. S.
Government agencies and in discussions with representatives of certain
of the claimant countries. Secretary Dulles predicted that we would
encounter our greatest difficulty in getting agreement to our proposed
joint organization to administer Antarctica, from Chile and Argentina,
who were emotionally aroused because their claims to Antarctica conflicted with the claim of the United Kingdom. For this reason it
might prove necessary to exclude the tip of the Palmer Peninsula,
where the Chilean, Argentine and U. K. claims were in conflict, from
the rest of Antarctica which was to be administered jointly by the
eight or ten claimant and interested states.
With respect to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles emphasized that he had a natural sympathy with their deSire to exclude the USSR from the joint administrative organization
and with their desire likewise to claim wide areas of the subcontinent forthwith for the United States. Indeed, this had been Secretary
Dulles' own personal position at the beginning of this exercise of rewriting existing policy. Before the conclusion of the exercise, however, he had come to feel that it would de impracticable to try to
exclude the USSR from the joint organization, and that an attempt to
do so would fail of majority support of the other countries involved.
Beyond this, as General Cutler hed said, Secretary Dulles saw no way
to push the Soviet Union out of Antarctica without resort to force.
For all these reasons he had come to feel that the legitimate objectives of the United States in Antarctica would be satisfied if a regime there could be set up which would demilitarize the entire area,
because possible use of this area for military bases was a matter of
great concern. The Australians were genuinely and legitimately worried about it, and the United States should likewise be concerned;
not eat . what might be done in the immediate future, but what might
occur with respect to the military uses of the area over the next
twenty years or more.
Secretary Dulles added his view that assertion by the
United States of a wide claim in the area would at once precipitate
conflicting claims and probably would not advance us very far toward
TOP SECRET
1