.
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3.3.2 DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
The pop syiten fer planning the suppert ef everseas miolear tests makes
4t necessary to sutmit requirements long before the shot schedule is in any way
firm.
Therefore, these early estimates are larv2iy coverned by the experience
gained from the pasteperation tallore? to suit whatever is already know
abeut the coming operation.
Se far it has proved safe to assume that each
eperation would be larger and more complex than its predecessor.
Since the underwater and high altitude shots, as shown in the preceding
section, were decided on shortly after the conclusion of Redwing, it was evident
from the beginning ef Hardtack planning that these shots would require a very
substantial amount of support in addition te that normelly provided.
.
On October 29, 1956 representatives of the J-3 Section, Joint Task Force
SEVEN, visited CTG 7.1 at Los Alamos te discuss Hardt-ck support requirenents,
stating that CJTF SEVEN needed these requirenents at the earliest possible
dete.
7.1 estimates at tat time are show in column 2 of Table 3.4 which
lists, except for motor vehicles, the principal items of military support of
both direct and indirect interest to 7G 7.1.
No distinction is drawn in the
table between itens of direct interest to TG 7.1, such as a comand and firing
ship and effects ships and aircraft, and items resulting from TO 7.1's require=
ments for services, such as base facilities, transportation and eommnications,
which generate material requirenents in the task groups which provide those
services,
t
CJTF SEVEN held a logistics and construction conference on February 19 ani
@ planning conference on February 20, 1957.
UpDUR
re
The first conference dis-
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