<7
3-93
3.19 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.19.1
General.
\
Sites and Scheduling.
The separation of weapons laboratovy activities into two sites as well
as establishment of multiple capabilities at each site provec to be one of
the primary means by which the operation was accomr’is'ed on e reasuna’ds
time scale,
It is recommended that futura operations follow the same pat-
tern, although substitution of Taongi for Bikini shovld preve to be extreme~
ly advantageous due to the more favorable weather situation as Taongi,
The
development of techniques for conducting open sea firings should also be
|
vigorously pursued because of their many operational advantages.
It appears that it would be advantageous to seperate weanons developrient
tests from effects tests in time or location.
In general, effects tests
.,
require a great deal more support, have many more operational limitations,
and interpeses schedule interferences with development tests.
Organization.
The fact that HARDTACK, which was larger thar all of the other Pacific
operations combined, was conducted on virtually the same time scale incirates
that despite problems the organization functioned efficiently.
Most of the problems which arose during the course of the operation
\
originated because of the split responsibility status of project officers or
senior latoratory representatives (Task Unit Commanders),
\
Tne project officer
or Task Unit Commander is charged by his home organization with the responsibility of carrying out an assigned scientific task.
This individual's
x
oy career progression depends to some extent on how well this task is accomp\\ S
& Xv
uw
i
;
j
!
lished, On the other hand, the same individual is also a member of the Task ‘] ”
See
Force, and therefore is subject to the direction of Task Group and Task Force
command elements, These directions are not always compatible with those
r
LrpqOE
=
\
PAGE /77,4 “~—