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5. Detection Net.
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A net of about 70 detection stations located
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within the USSR and China, as described in detail in Attachment A,
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backed up by inspection teams and aerial reconnaissance, would be
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essential for monitoring possible Soviet tests conducted in all feasible
environments within those countries. Full operational status would
of all nuclear shots in the USSR and China which give signals equivalent
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The detection system described above has
6. Risk of Detection.
been designed to achieve a high probability of detection and identification
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techniques and capabilities.
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a high probability may not be required since it may only be necessary to
achieve a situation where the Soviets cannot afford to take the risk of
in a clandestine nuclear test. This risk would increase
being caught
rapidly if several tests were required.
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require approximately two years after an international agreement is,
reached although a few stations could be installed earlier. Without such
a detection system located inside the USSR and China, the detection
coverage would be inadequate for safeguarding a nuclear test limitation
agreement. Should there be an international agreement to pursue
technical studies and design of the detection system of the type described
in Appendix A, a substantial amount of information could be dis closed
by the U. S. without revealing Atomic Energy Restricted Data although
it wovld be necessary to disclose presently classified detection