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with Chancellor Adenaver's statement at Hamburg. If the Soviet Union
could be brought to accept such a zone, Governor Stassen felt that it
would be an entering wedge to loosen the Soviet hold on the East European satellites.
Governor Stassen next turned to his third recommendation,
calling for the establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, the Northwestern United States and Western Canada.
This, again, was illustrated on a mp. Governor Stassen felt that
there was some genuine hope of Soviet acceptance of this proposal.
Governor Stassen reiterated the point that if any one of
these three recommendations, or all three together, were accepted
by the Soviet Union, such acceptance would be tantamount to beginning to open up the Soviet Union, which had long been an objective
of the United States. Of course, he added, in putting forward
these three specific recommendations we were leaving a number of
very important subjects for follow-up negotiations. The reasons
for leaving these subjects for subsequent negotiation was that,
for example, our proposal for the cessation of the production of
nuclear weapons would require e most long-drawn-out, detailed, and
comprehensive inspection system. Furthermore, cessation of nuclear
production in the absence of a thoroughgoing inspection system would
not be in the interests of the United States. It took only a certain relatively small number of nuclear weapons to provide the means
for a surprise attack. It took a much larger number of nuclear weapons to provide an adequate defense against nuclear attack. The field
of ballistic missiles, likewise, was an area to be left for follow-up
negotiations after the initial step had been taken. Ballistic missiles required an even more complete inspection system than other
means of delivery of nuclear warheads. Accordingly, this was not a
suitable proposal for an opening step.
At this point, Governor Stassen passed around copies of a
draft letter of reply by the President to Bulganin (copy filed in
the minutes of the meeting). In this hé had suggested ways and means
of resuming negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament. Simultaneously with this proposal to Bulganin, the United States could also
take the initiative toward negotiations in the United Nations as well
as through ordinary diplomatic channels. Also, if the National Security Council agreed with these three recommendations, Governor Stassen
recomended that consultations be begun promptly with appropriate menbers of the United States Senate.
Upon the conclusion of Governor Stassen's statement, Mr.
Cutler called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the Council with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which
were in opposition to the recommendations made by Governor Stassen.
General Twining read portions of the written views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, which had previously been circulated to the members
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