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PAGE 3 RHWNEAAOOOS UNCLAS////EYES ONLY////
1N SOME DIFFICULTY OUE TO TYPHOON OLGA AND ASKED WHETHER MAG 36 SHOULD
CONTINUE WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT PLANS. ROGER ADVISED THAT, IN HIS JUDGMENT,
1T WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSION COULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT ENIWETOK
AS EARLY AS NOV. 1. LT.
COL. ROBINSON INFORMED HIM THAT
IT WAS FEASIBLE
FOR THE CH-53 HELICOPTERS TO STAGE FROM KWAJALEIN AND ASKED WHETHER
WOULD BE REASONABLE,
APPROXIMATELY NOV.
RECEIVE THEM. HE
7
IN LIGHT OF THE FACT, FOR THEM TO COME AHEAD ON
1 AND REMAIN AT KWAJALEIN UNTIL ENIWETOK COULD
INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ASKED KWAJALEIN
WHETHER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND ASKED RAY
TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT QUESTION. ROGER ADVISED LT. COL. ROBINSON THAT
HE COULD NOT AND WOULD
NOT MODIFY THE EXY¥STING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT
REQUEST BUT THAT HE WOULD SEE TO IT THAT AN APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION
TO THE REQUEST WAS SENT TO CINCPAC. LATE THAT SAME EVENING, CAPT
MCDYER OF THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING
IN JAPAN TELEPHONED RAY AT KWAJALEIN
TO CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING WITH MAG 36. THESE
TWO TELEPHONE CALLS,
WEITHER OF WHICH WAS ORIGINATED BY ROGER RAY, WERE HIS ONLY DIRECT
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE HELICOPTER RESOURCES. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER, HE RECEIVED AN ENFORMATION COPY OF A FIRST MARINE ATR WING MESSAGE
TO COM, SEVENTH FLEET, WHEREIN HE, RAY, WAS BADLY MISQUOTED AS TO THE
EXTENT OF STORM DAMAGE AT ENIWETOK. HE, THEREFORE, ORIGINATED A
SOCTISS:
:
—
.
tie. 7.