from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory with whom the censorship program has been informally discussed have indicated that as
far as is known none of the
"letter-writers" at the IVY Opera-
tion were employed by the Commission or its contractors and
that personnel of the Commission and its contractors are entrusted with equally sensitive information at the laboratories
in the United States without their personal communications
being subjected to censorship.
Additionally,
personnel have specifically commented that
these scientific
"it 1s becoming
very difficult to obtain scientific workers for test activities,
Without these workers in good supply, one can only expect a
substantial delay in the nuclear weapons program,
Many workers
are away from their families for six months of the year and
they are becoming restive.
Every effort should be made to
minimize irritations which tend to drive workers out of the
program, "
9. It is believed that benefits derived from a mail censorship program can be attained from an intensified security
education program,
As observed previously, censorship of per-
sonal communications was not in effect at Operation SANDSTONE
in 1948 or Operation GREENHOUSE in 1951.
All personnel involved
in these operations were instructed to practice self-censorship
and were given specific instructions in tne matter of what
could be related in personal communications.
We are not aware
of any violations at these tests similar to the letter-writing
incidents at Operation IVY.
It appears that during Operation IVY
the regulations of the commander of the Task Force, while adequate, were not implemented by the Task Groups in a manner which
would insure that all personnel were aware of their specific
security responsibilities.
In some instances, however,
-7-
the
Appendix "a"