ie,
the test activities following the return of Task Force personn
from the Proving Grounds.
Censorship, in addition, would not
prevent the press from speculating on activities of the Task
Force at the Proving Grounds,
To be completely effective a ma
censorship program would have to be supplemented with voluntar
press censorship which could be established only with great
difficulty if 1t could be established at all.
4,
There has been no censorship of personal mail for
personnel of the Department of Defense since the end of host1ll
in World War II even for troops on front line duty in Korea.
emphasizes the possibility that a personal mail censorship
program could raise serious morale problems.
¥
5.
It is believed that benefits derived from a mail
censorship program can be attained from an intensified securit
education program,
The Commander, Joint Task Force Seven in ¢
letter dated March 24,
1953, to the Chief of Staff, United St«
Army,
a copy of which was circulated as AEC 597/12, noted the
many
problems involved in a mail censorship program and
recommended that ".
.
. The policy of self-censorship of pers
mail be continued without recourse to official censorship back
up by intensified security indoctrination and security educati
and examination programs."
The Commander of Joint Task Force
Seven has since forwarded to the Division of Security his progr
security regulations which require individual instructton and
examination of each member of the Task Force by unit commande:
to assure that such personnel have specific understanding of
their security responsibilities and are specifically ins3tructe
as to what information may be included in personal corresponde
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