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Secretary Humphrey stated that he simply couldn't see how
this comtry could jeopardize the one great advantage that it now
possesses over the Soviet Union. To him it was unthinkable that we
should take any measures to retard our progress in this field. We
must keep all the edge we now heve.
The President said he could understand Secretary Humphrey's
view, but what was the long-run answer to this preblem? Secretary
Humphrey then asked the President whether he really believed that the
Soviets would honor a promise to stop conducting weapons tests. The
President replied that the minute we learned that the Soviets had
not stopped testing these weapons, we would curselves start our own
tests again.
Admiral Radford pointed out that, unhappily, we were in the
wkward position of being unable to explain to our friends and allies
why we felt it necessary to go on testing these weapons.
Admiral Strauss then turned ts the President and expressed
the hcre that he would let him show the Fresident charts indicating
the results of prior tests of nuclear weapons, before the President
mud? a lecision to accept a moraterium.
The President said that cof course ha had ne intention cf
naking any impulsive decisicn or so grave a matter, but he did insist
thet we were now pursuing 4 course which had no futvre for us. All
we ere doing now is to make more certain cur capability to destroy.
The Attorney General expressed serious contern as to the
effect on our own people of eccepting a cessation of nuclear tests.
& ccuntry hed taken the develcpnert of atomic weapons more cally
hor th peoples cf other neticns, ana Amtrircans would react adverss» he pellevei, to any decisior. to disecntinue tests cf? rucleer
tr. Flemming said he felt, with the President, that some-
hew or other we must develop something that would give hore to cur
people. Otherwise, we would produce an atmcesphere cf despair, and
pecple would feel that there was no use in trying to defend thenSelves ageinst atomic warfare. Such despair would have very bed
effects on the whole mobilization program and on the program for
civil defense.
Governor Stassen suggested that the answer te thie proulem
ord
AAVUETT YHMOHNASIA
States could offer to the Soviet Union.
Force was chriously cne cof
Ungse alternatives. But if the Soviets could be induced to move toward peaceful courses cf action, we had other elternatives--fcr exsmple, increased trade--with which tc respond. If, however, the
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“d LHSIMG AHL LY axondowday
might lie in am approach consisting cf alternatives which the United