ow
four years.
2
=
What is more important, in view of the rate of
radioactive decay, etc., we would actually not increase the
total amount of potential radioactive fallout beyond that
prevailingthis sumer.
Admittedly the policing of this agreement would not be easy,
but an international inspection agency could be created which
could determine compliance fairly accurately for each side.
And, as a matter of fact, such a policy would penalize us so
Little that we might continue it for some time even if Russia
did not cooperate.
Actually, the only tests of any size and
importance which now appear could not be carried out underground, would be in connection with the development of anti-<
missile missiles and some “plowshare" tests.
While a majority of the Committee recommends that the
first proposal be the one made, it would be possible to go
still further if necessary and elimbaate all above-ground
testing for a period of, say, two years.
This would make it
much harder to develop anti-gissile missiles.
It would also
prevent tests on some peaceful uses such as "ditch-digger”
unless special exceptions were made for them, possibly under
international inspection.
Such an agreement could not be
readily policed, especially on small weapons, and would
probably be evaded by the Russians unless there were extensive
policing inside Russia, but it would practically eliminate
any addition to fallout during the period the agreement was
effective.