the commanders themselves, to the USARPAC staff and to the Sandpiper
staff. Hqwever,
maay obstaclem and difficulties hailto be overcome on
the “working levels.” Iscom Kwajalein
a directive on U
was desi~ted
January 1948 (Annex 2)●
CTG ?.7 and issued
.~boutthe same time CIMCPAC
directed Iscom Kwajalein to report to CJTF-?. While these directives
were too late to avoid giving rise to confusion, the nebulous situatioa
regarding tasks to be performed and/or.a66ignments of responsibility
yrecluded earlier issumce.
3.
Subsequently, the concept that logistic and administrative
m~tters should be handled through normal service channels w~s ~artially
modified. Requisitions from the ?ro~ect area for &gy
type supplies
and personnel were submitted through Hq JTF-7 (Fwd) in order to insure
expeditious tictionand to coordinate with shippi~
cHAPTER THREE -Farticiwtion
1.
of OahU . CommandQ*
All of the commandsIn Oahu,beginningin mid-October19470
contributedin effort,men ad materialsto Sandstone. Each COmand
received& directive from the appropriate Wshingtoa Department to
render till practicable sup~ort and Sadstone was placed in high priority
(See Dex
3).
The late date of some of these directives did not inter-
fere with Sandstone operations since the local commanders initiated
action on their own authority
a.
~.
General Hull set forth initial requirements on
16 October in a memorandum for General Decker, subject: “Aert
Orders”
4
SECTION V
mwl’=