PART V
Conolu8ion~
A. Miesionand Organization
1. The exeoutionof the J-2 missionduringthe early phasesof
OperationSANDSTONEwas renderedparticularlydiffioultdue to the
neoessityfor xmintainingthe unusuallyhigh militarysecurity
.
olassifioationa
assignedto the operationby higherauthorityand,
oonourrently,
not delaylngthe mountingof the fieldoperating
foroeo,both civilianand military,for initialrehabilitation
and
oonstnaotion
work in the forwardareas. These difficulties
were
aggravatedby the oompresaedoperationstime schedule. However,
effeotiveintelligence
and oounterintelligenoe
polioiesand procedureswere devisedin sufficienttime to meet requirements.It
is consideredthat all of the elementseaaentialto a well balanoed
progrmias requiredby the missionassignedby the Joint Chiefsof
Staffwere embraoedin the wmpleted J-2 plan and implementedduring
the operation.
2. Personnelprowred from the Armed Forces,both for the J-2 Seotion and for the Jdlnt SeourityGroup (TG 7.5)were uniformlyof
high oalibre●nd possessedthe requisiteteohnioalqualifications
for dutiesto whioh they were ●ssigned. Equipmentand suppliesfor
seouri~ troops,suoh ● s autamtio ueapona,floodlights
and ooncertlna
wire, as well aa apeoialinvestigative
equipment,provedadequatefor
all phases of the operation. Although it waa difficult to anticipate
* Consolidatedfor both the J-2 secti~, Headquarters,
Joint Task Force
Seven and Task GToup7.S (JointSecurityGroup),Joint Task Foroe
Seven.
SeotionII
-.
72