upon "cooperation" among the Services.
Operational control has
worked well as an expedient, but its scope has never been suffici-~
ently defined to insure that a perfect alignment of command authority with command responsibility will exist in its employment.
WNever-
theless, under such an arrangement, it is possible for a reasonably
clear-cut division of authority to be made and, as long as the Armed
Forces endure as three separate branches, it seems logical that
such division within a joint effort should, if possible, follow the
line of reasoning which has resulted in the autonomy now accredited
to each of the three.
Such a division almost, but not quite, existed with regard to
the air effort in Operation SANDSTONE.
The Conmander, Air Forces,
controlled all aircraft operating in the Eniwetok area during the
actual time of the tests except the Naval patrol planes.
This last
remant of control was presumably withheld from him on the grounds
that anti-submarine patrol is a responsibility of the United States
Navy.
Whether or not primary service responsibilities should be
allowed to govern the organization of a joint force is open to
debate.
The subject should receive consideration at the highest
joint staff level.
STAFF OF THE AIR COMMANDER |
With three exceptions only, the members of the staff of the
Commander, Air Forces, Joint Task Force SEVEN, possessed no back-
ground of experience or information directly connected with the
Section VIII
“9h