emergency requests for air shipmente
In this connection, it should be
mentioned that much of this last-minute emergency airlift was oaused by
lack of prior planning on the part of units of the Task Force.
Much of
the materiel should have been anticipated earlier and shipped by water.
During the period of actual testing, a large number of "VIP's"
were transported to and from the areas as official observers.
Sevoral
weeks before "Z" day, a comprehensive program was planned whereby six to
eight hundred personnel oould be moved quickly to the Zone of Interior by
air at the close of the operation.
The Task Force was able to "count
noses" and establish a very definite schedule of movement in advance, and
as a result, personnel movement to the United States by air was carried
out as planned.
he
Operational Planning.
Field Order No. 1, dated 14 November 1947, Headquarters, Joint
Task Force SEVEN, assigned eertain responsibilities covering a wide vatricty
of operations to the Commander, Air Forces.
The staff of the Air Commander
decided that these responsibilities, which were stated in general terns,
could best be achieved by taking the following steps:
First, break down the responsibilities outlined in the
Field Order into tasks to be performed by subordinate units of the Air)
Foree and appropriate Naval Air Units.
Seesond, prepare an operations plan which would distribute
the responsibilities to these units in a general manner, thus alerting them
to their future duties and assigments.
Third, prepare a series of operations orders which would
state in specific terms the duties each unit would be required to perform.
It was recognized that these three steps could not be followed
Section VIII
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