aaa:
with J#4 of JTF 7, on the problems of packaging, handling, and shipping
hazard
materials associated with Redwing.
The Safety Advisor attended
the meeting calledhy, J-4, JTF 7, at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland,
Calif., in February 1956. Problems of shipping and handling hazardous and
valuable materials were discussed.
For this meeting’s discussion and for
subsequent publicution as safety annex to the JTF 7 shipping concept, the
Safety Advisor prepared a paper on the safety problems (including various
emergencies) associated with active components of Redwing test devices.
3.17.2
Personnel
Roy Reider, Safety Director, LASL, was named Safety Advisor to the
Scientific Task Group; and four additional safety officers were chosen to
permit two safety engineers to be in residence in the FA for most of the
period from March 2 to August 2, 1956.
All members of the safety group (staff members of LASL) had sub-
stantial experience on one or more previous test operations.
f
:
*In future operations consideration should be given to using safety personnel from major participating laboratories, integrating them with individ- =
uals who have had previous test operation experience. Such integration
should be made complete enough to function for the benefit of all elements
of the Scientific Task Group without excessive duplication of personnel and
efforts.
3.17.3
Operations
A Safety Officer was on duty at both Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls. Exchange and rotation were effected with minimum loss of availability of safety
personnel. No Safety Officer was on duty at overseas stations other than
these two atolls, nor was any deemed necessary.
For J-3 the Safety Officer prepared safety requirements of pressurized
dry runs of those test devices using gas systems.
All personnel elevators used in test device towers received safety
checks in conjunction with H&N engineering.
The movement of all sensitive materials, specifically components of
test devices, into and out of the PPG, within and between atolis, was car~
ried out with procedures advised upon by the Safety Officer who was in attendance at one stage or another during such movements.
Subsequent to the failure of the Plevice, the Safety Advisor
monitored all procedures carried out in preparation for the return of the
device components to the ZI.
Abort procedures have received detailed
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