ceail
*Another example might be the number of people permitted continuing
access to the assembly area and shot barges who have only incidental need
to visit these highly classified and safety hazard areas. Because of their
limited knowledge the activities, the casuals threatened to cause operational difficulties by tripping over cables, lines, and other essential con~
nections. Access to these areas should not be considered as a matter of
prestige, but as a matter of necessity,
*In line with the foregoing comments, a further suggestion is made as
to the marking of badges. It has been the general rule that Q-cleared or
Top Secret cleared individuals may have access to Restricted Data. The
nature of PPG working premises, with only partial partitions which permit
ordinary conversation to be heard throughout a building, makes it almost
clearance would also have the Sigma category access indicated on their
badges, whereas those with Q clearance had no indication of Sigma category.
In addition, as noted above, some individuals had a military clearance indicated on their badges, but no Sigma category. It would seem more rea-~
sonable to adopt a uniform practice of indicating Sigma category on all
badges. This would require the assignment of a Sigma category numberto
«indicate "No access to Restricted Data." It is realized that the assignment
of a Sigma category does not authorize all information within that category,
but only that portion for which the individual has a need-to-know, but it does
set a maximum limit for access. The Security Liaison Office of TG 7.1 in
A
Restricted Data. It has also been noted that individuals having Top Secret
-
hoy
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impossible to prevent Restricted Data from being heard by visitors to the
Administrative Compound. However, access has been granted to the Administrative Compound to individuals who were not authorized access to
the second half of the operation was used by members of the Task Group
for receiving assurance that there was a bona fide need-to-know on each
individual request for access,
3.14.4
Exclusion Areas
Exclusion areas and physical security thereof were a responsibility of
TG 7.5. As TG 7.1 had prime interest in exclusion areas, all recommenda-
tions for access were sent to TG 7.5 through TG 7.1 for the latter's con-
currence.
Number of personnel authorized continuing access to the Exclusion
Areas is as follows:
_
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