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in a few instances when circumstances required were military personnel
authorized access to Sigma 14 information.
Several problems arose during the operation relative to the basis for
access to Restricted Data. To illustrate, a few examples will be given.
The most disconcerting related to the visits of the VIP parties.
At
the beginning of the operation, the personnel of the VIP visiting groups arrived with Sigma 14 or Sigma 4 clearances, in roughly equal proportions.
In order to determine what local access should be given, a talk by Willfam
E. Ogle was drafted and approved by General Starbird, in which information
relative to the weight, size, and SES on the several devices
was specifically itemized. Some technical description of the operation of
the devices and the diagnostic experiments was also included. It was deter-
mined that the contents of this talk could be given to the VIP visiting groups
even though certain members thereof had arrived with only a Sigma 4 clear-
ance. In addition, these VIP groups were authorized to have access to the
t
external appearance of each of the devices.
Whether or not it was so intended, these standards were apparently
applied internally within the Task Force organization as setting the maxi-
~
mum limit of Sigma 4 clearance. The VIP parties had included in their
+.
membership many observers whose positions in the home organization were ~
well known to members of the Task Groups. Hence, some standard of needto-know was also established by the membership of these VIP parties. Sub-
|
sequent instructions from AEC, Washington Headquarters, indicated that there
was some doubt as to the propriety of the initial Washington approvals on
access to the external appearances of the devices, but thesé subsequent instructions in no way modified the approved talk on technical aspects.
*It is recommended that a better screening be attempted at the Washington level in the declaration of membership in VIP parties and the assignment of Sigma categories. Furthermore, it is suggested that the amount of
weapon data approved for such visitors either be materially reduced, or that
only Sigma 14 approved visitors be included in the VIP parties. Another
possibility would be to divide the parties into categories of access and not
attempt to brief, in a single briefing, visitors with such a diversity in category access. Furthermore, VIP and technical observers should not be sent
on test operations for routine indoctrination that could more easily be han-
died in CONUS.
Many requests were received from individuals, who appar-
ently had a need-to-know, for access to the assembly building and the shot
barges when the individuals could more readily obtain that information at
Sandia Base or one of the weapon research laboratories.
The workers at
the PPG were operating under less than ideal conditions and under the
strain of a test operation with deadline schedules, so that observers become
something of a nuisance and safety problem.
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