ERE.
_
was issued. In that document security requirements for small quantities
and bulk shipments of documents were differentiated. On April 26, 1956,
Amendment No. 2 wag issued. This document expanded the scope to include
"Classified Material”as well as documents; furthermore, the policy for the
transmission of classified documents and materials within the PPG was set
forth. By the end of Redwing, twenty-five TG 7.1 personnel were authorized
to transmit classified documents/material in their possession to or from
the PPG.
*During the operation, a major difficulty arose on the official mail ship-~
ment of bulky material. The Post Office Department diverted such mail to
the Customs Office at the port of entry nearest to the delivery point in
CONUS, requiring the addressee to recover the package mail there. The
resulting delay interfered with the evaluation of test data in some situations,
Although the problem was referred to the Washington level, no solution was
obtained. Instructions were received in the field to work out some technique
to get the bulk shipments into the U. S. by some other method than mail
channels. There wereinsufficient funds and personnel for couriers; hence
it was necessary for TG 7.1 to request civilian contractor employees to
carry the packages through customs at Honolulu and then arrange for mailing there. That practice is, of course, wholly inconsistent with standing AEC
instructions on the personal carrying of classified materials and has undermined established practices that have been repeatedly urged in security education programs,
r
i
4
+,
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It is imperative that the Washington level overcome this
anomalous situation before another operation is undertaken at the PPG.
3.14.3
Access to Restricted Data
Concerning exchange of Restricted Data between DOD and DOD-contractor participants and AEC contractors, it was determined that all DOD
and DOD-contractor personnel required certification in accordance with
Chapter 2318, Atomic Energy Commission Manual. Accordingly, no travel
to the PPG was permitted until proper certification was on file with TG 7.5.
Certification for personnel of TU-3 was accomplished by Commander, Field
Command, AFSWP, with liaison channels established with J-1 of TG 7.1.
For other DOD participants, certification was accomplished by JTF 7, normally with concurrence of J-1 of TG 7.1. Only when certification was made
a matter of record with TG 7.5 was this portion of individual clearance for
the PPG deemed completed.
As of the end of the operation 876 DOD per-
sonnel were authorized access to Restricted Data by Field Command,-AFSWP,
and 268 by TG 7.1, making a total of 1,144.
Generally, certification was for access to Sigma 4 information. Only
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