ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS, OVER TIME, ON HUMAN ATTITUDES
AND BEHAVIOR, OF AWARENESS THAT NATIONS ARE CAPABLE
OF MUTUAL ANNIHILATION
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The word “annihilation” has given us some difficulty in our discussions. If the dictionary gense of
the term—‘reduction to nothing”—is literally applied, and it is further postulated that this w@uld be
an inescapable result of nuclear war, it is likely that most people would place the avoidance of huclear
warwell above any other goals. There would be many who wouldstill hold individual liberty agd free-
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dom, and human dignity dearer than life—for themselves and for the Nation—but we believe]
great many more people would rationalize the loss of these as temporary. This could embrace
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the goal
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.
of keeping alive the spark of desire for liberty, for freedom, and for recognition of human dignity, to be
fanned into flame at an appropriate time.
But we believe that something short of this meaning of “annihilation” was intended—peghaps a
degree of physical damagesimilar to that which we have discussed as an assumption underlying qurfirst
estimate.
At any rate, we have continued that assumption asa basis for treating this part of the qhestion.
(See page 9.)
If we were to assume that the ‘‘awareness”’ were to be limited to the potential for damage and qestruc-
tion, we would then beinclined to the belief that attitudes and behavior of the majority would be attuned
It is of the utmost importance that real knowledge and understanding ofthe effects of nuclear weapons
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be accompanied by increased knowledge and understanding of both the broad aspects of national Ceurity,
including its basic goals, and the specific countermeasures that can reduce the effects of nuclear attack.
We havetried to estimate the effects on human attitudes and behavior of a growing awarpness of
the potential of nuclear stockpiles of nations for mutual damage and destruction when that awageness is
accompanied by greater knowledge and understanding of our national goals, policies and ftate of
preparedness.
In our opinion, the same program of involvement and participation discussed above would hhveseveral wholesome effects on humanattitudes and behavior during a period of prolonged “cold war” or
international tension, whether chronic or acute.
Webelieve that after such involvement, the people of the United States would be more appyeciative
than formerly of creative imagination and constructive ingenuity on the part of their leaders in rpsolving
.
of full understanding and acceptance of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. We we@uld ex-
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more healthy and constructive than it has commonly been in the past. It should be anticipated
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international differences without resorting to general war.
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This, we believe, would be an inevitabfe result
pect more critical attitudes toward proposed national policies and actions, but the criticism
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to the avoidance of nuclear war, no matter what the cost. There would be weakened public support of
policies that involved any substantial risk of nuclear war, even though such policies were designed to
defend our cherished concepts of human dignity and freedom, for the “awareness” would be focussed on
® a result little different from the dictionary meaning of “annihilation” discussed above.
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process will initially occasion difficulty and embarrassmentfor the leaders as public involvement ig discussion of foreign policy issues increases. We believe firmly, however, that the immediate problemp
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give way to long-range benefits.
We would expect that there would be greater understanding of foreign policy issues. Sucl{ understanding would result in greater public acceptance of proposals to increase our defensive strength—both
military and civil. It would shift the basis of support of the national leaders from a kind ofresigged reliance to understanding andactive backing. In short, the hands of our national leaders would be ulfimately
strengthened, and they would have more freedom for maneuver in the development and implembntation
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