atmospheric conduct, the letter gives some specific justifications for the
need for atmospheric testing including the problems inherent in solely underground testing, the great advances and the large data base that the Russians
are building up in their accelerated atmospheric program, and specific
military areas which can best be addressed only by atmospheric testing and
are so very important to the nation's military defense strategy.
In addition
to noting the engineering problems with doing testing underground and the
Slowness with which such testing goes a strong point is made about the
relative capability for diagnostic instrumentation with underground versus
atmospheric testing. Further the question of an overseas test site is
addressed and Eniwetok with its political difficulties versus the use of
Christmas Island with the as yet uncertain availability are noted and it is
Stated that tests could be done by air drops probably staged from Hawaii
with limited instrumentation on some small island such as Johnston which
is at present being pursued but which is not as desirable as having a large
island test base. Further it is stated that a special requirement exists
in connection with the rocket lifted test shot for which Johnston Island
is the most logical launch point because of the available facilities.
He
further addresses the question of outer space testing and states that because
of the projected cost of an initial 100 million dollars over a two-year
period to develop such a capability that such a capability is not being
considered for the planned program. In the area of fallout and political
implications of nuclear yield it is stated that a total yield of approximately
21 megaton of which abovt 8 megaton would be fission yield is projected for
the planned series of
events as compared to the approximately 120 megatens
of yield already totaled during the recent Soviet tests. Part of the summary
of the cover letter reads as follows: "In addition to provisions for flexibility,
current planning should provide for preparation for a second test series, about
a year later, looking to more dramatic advances than are possible in an early
time frame.
In fact, it is essential to plan for a second series in order to
accomplish the very important effects tests that could not be included in the
early time scale.
In looking at what test devices can be made available in
the April to July period, it is apparent that we are suffering to some extent
from the three-year test moratorium. During that period while the United
States was negotiating in good faith, the bulk of our nuclear weapon design
effort was oriented towards devices that coul
d be stockpil
ed with adequate
assurance without tests. Thus, the clim
ate was not conducive to beld.
concepts requiring experimental checks.
The possibility of being able to.
test seemed very remote.
In contrast, the available evidence indi
cates
7
from the very outset of the moratorium,
the Soviets have anticipated atmo
¢
pheric testing and have oriented their
efforts toward Significant advances.
requiring such testing.
In summary, it is clear that a rate of
progress
adequate to main
tain our relative military posture can
be attained only th
h
resort to atmospheric testing; indeed,
much vital information on effects and
many possible technical advances, woul
d not be realized at all through unde
rground trees eeone The letter also
contains 4 lengthy enclosures which
eer a
ypes of tests by category, the types of
devices with details
© Giagnostics and type of device, the
amount of yield as well as listing
for the President the numbers and types of
tests of each of the nuclear
powers since the beginning of nuclear
testing.