Ul2e tunnel complex.
(I believe that should read Ul2b)
inis proptem aztuse aicer
the Chena event and was complicated by the tritium residue remaining from the Evans
event of Hardtack IL." "The combination of the external radiation whole body exposures in the Ul2e tunnel and the additional internal exposure in the U12b tunnel
has resulted in 108 miners and supporting personnel receiving, as of Nov. 24, 1961,
a combined whole body exposure in excess of 3 REM in ° one quarter and of these,
38 in excess of 5 REM in one year.
ees
No individual was exposed to more than 8.045 REM.
Because of our inability to continue full-scale tunnel operations within the
established normal peace time radiation critiera,
were curtailed on Nov. 27, 1961.
quarter
the U12b and Ul2e tunnel operations
Underground workers who were approacing 3 REM per
were removed from the tunnels, as well as any individuals who may have
received a dosage of more than three REM per quarter."
«
A 29 November letter was sent by Dr. Seaborg as Chairman of the NSC Committee
on Atmospheric Testing Policy to the President and the contents of this letter
are extremely important, of course, so I will have a copy of this made for our
use after getting permission since it is Secret RD. The letter begins by
noting that a careful study has been made of all of the nuclear test shots
proposed by the weapens labs and the DoD for inclusion in the possible shot
window which may be authorized for a 3-month period beginning in the spring
of '62 and it is noted that the proposals were reviewed in light of the
continuing objectives of our nuclear weapons program, our position relative
to the USSR and our current state of readiness as adversely affected by the
test mcratorium.
It states that "some 49 possible test shots were reviewed,
of which a minimum of
are recommended for inclusion in the early program."
The letter notes the 3 general categories of testing which are in order of
discussion. One, effects of nuclear weapons on such things as hardened
missile bases, missiles in flight, radar and communication, and on Naval
vessels and thcir equipment.
It is stated also "the area of greatest interest
lies in effects at very high altitudes as they apply to AICBM defenses and
to the kill capability of our own AICBM warheads. A series of 5 such tests
has been projected, varying in yields from a few hundred kilotons to about
1-1/2 megatons, and in altitudes from 20 kilometers to above 400 kilometer.
However, practical considerations with respect to development of instrumentation
techniques and related preparations make it unrealistic to plan for more than
two of these shots in the short time available. Category two is that of advanced
concepts for improving weapon effectiveness and decreasing warhead vulner-ability, and these cover a wide range of possible design changes, etc. The
third category noted includes tests that combine both developmental and
weapons verification objectives. As to the designs that might be tested under
this category the letter states "it is important that these designs be subject
to experimental verification not nnly to give confidence as to the effectiveness
of devices stockpiled as weapons but also, importantly to enable the labora-
tories to use the information so obtained as a basis for more advanced steps
into new weapons technology. In addition to addressing the general categories
and justification for the different types of tests which are desired for