THE
WEEKLY
J
TIA
Vol. LAXVNo. 15
April 11, 1960
NEWSMAGAZINE
NATIONAL AFFAIRS
-THE NATION
picion between the two nations was un-
important—could not gain any really decisive advantage even if it did cheat.
In the sessions that hanimered out the
decision to accept the Soviet moratorium
proposal, Air Force Secretary James
Douglas. sitting in for traveling Defense
Secretary Thomas Gates. made it clear
that the Pentagon. to a surprising extent.
guarded test-ban treaty. For one thing,
the Russians may really not want any
agreement at all. may be dangling concessions to prolong the talks and thus
achieve their original aim of getting the
U.S. to halt nuclear tests without any
agreement on inspection. On this. the
U.S. might get a better reading at the sum-
caught a glint of something that hinted at
chance for an inspection agreement out-
Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev resolve the basic conflicts on inspection and
control measures at the summit. it will
still take the test-ban negotiators months
to work out the details.
After a treaty is signed. it will take two
yeats or more to set up a functioning
detection system. As the U.S. learned after
the armistice in Korea. reaching a truce
Toward Disarmament?
During the long. tortuous nuclear-testban wrangle between the U.S. and Russia.
it often seemed that neither side really
expected a test ban. that the wall of susbreachable. But two weeks azo. the world
* Russian willingness to negotiate. At the
i U.S.-British-Soviet test-ban conference in
‘Geneva. Russian Delegate Semyon K.
Tsarapkin made what seemed to be a significant Concession.
weighed the risks and costs of a test ban.
Central Intelligence Agency Chicf Allen
Dulles reported that the CIA had no evidence that Russia had ever shown any
interest in testing to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Any break in Russia’s wall
In a departure from Russia's longtime
insistencé that a nuclear ‘est ban must
start with a flat ban on all tests. detect-
of suspicion and secrecy. he added. would
be to the U.S.’s interests. Atomic Energy
Commission Chairman John McCone, arguing that the U.S. needs underground
able or not. Tsarapkin agreed to accept
the U.S.'s distinction between 1) detect-
if an adequate detection system is worked
out, and 2) smaller underground tests.
Through the Haze. At the President's
Camp David mountain retreat in Mary-
Merely the Beginning. The President's
stacles still Iving in the way of a safe-
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inspection system, dnd agree to a “cuordi-
nated research program” for improving
detection techniques.
.
Even before Macmillan’s plane left
London, the Administration had decidedin
its own councils to accent) Tsarapkin’s
Moratorium proposal in che interest of
getting a test-ban treaty that might: possitly tead to progress on disarmament.
Cutting through the haze of passion that
has often obscured the facts on both sides
of the Ces¢-han debate, Ghe Administration
had areived ac the conclusion that 11a
test-ban treaty would be well worth while
if it made possible eventual progress toward controlled disarmament; and 2) Russie would) probably not risk) trying to
cheat an ivspected test ban. and—most
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land last week. Britain's Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan and President Eisenhower discussed the Soviet proposal oves
the course of two days. agreed on a joint
statement accepting a “voluntary moraterium™ on below-threshold
tests—provided that Russia enter into a treaty banning detectable tests under an adequate
vigilance is just beginning. Perhaps a
greater danger than the risk of undetected
underground testing is the risk thai the
U.S. would be lulled into relaxation by ©
the mere existence of an agreement.
moratorium decision lett plenty of ob-
them (see box next page). Said Tsarap-
Britain agree to a “voluntary” moratorium on subthreshold tests while experts
work out better decection techniques.
tive. the problem of constant patrol and
found himsell almost afone in the Administration’s top councils, and at the end the
President ruled against him.
which the U.S. is not willing to include in
the treaty ban because at present there
is no known practical way of detecting
detection—provided that the U.S. and
with Communists can be merely the be-
ginning of harassments and frustrations.
And even if the detection systemis efiec-
tests to develop tactical nuclear weapons.
able tests. which the U.S. is willing to ban
kin: Russia will agree to a treaty banning only tests above the threshold of
mit in mid-May. But even if President
had come around to a conviction that the
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Cutting through the haze that has obscured the facts.