which
Upon return to Rongerik island, Ve made another pass at 250! during
instruments recorded activity of 340 mr/hr.
Radio reception was poor at this low altitude 80 we climbed to 5000!
inan attenpt to establish contact with Fred tower or the USS Estes, direct.
Neither attempt was suceessful, so further radio messages were relayed througt
. Captain Hughes at Kwajalein.
I was primarily concerned in getting an additior
airplene - either a PEM or an SA~16 ~ in order to get the people off the islan
as quickly as possible.
After about 30 minutes of intermittent and frequently
garbled radio messages, I requested the pilot to return to Rongerik Island
and prepare to evacuate as many as possible in our own aircraft, realizing
that if other planes were not available, the Navy UF would have to make two
trips.
Since it was already approaching noon, this entailed getting the first
trip over with as quickly as possible in order to avoid an after dark take off
from the lagoon with the last load of evacuees.
~
While making our descent, the pilot received a message requesting inforina
tion on the radiological situation.
I asked him to reply ‘that the only readiz
I had was 340 mr/br at 250' altitude over the island,
This message was garble
during transmission and was apparently received at TG 7.4 as "340 MR at 250'"
which meant little or nothing.
At 1130 I landed on the island, and, after making a few readings at vario
places within the living areas, I briefed the men on what I knew of the
situation and what was being done for them.
It is appropriate here to remark
that I consider the group to be an extremely well-disciplined one.
There was
no panic, nor apparent dismay, and all of the men were willing to do whatever
was necessary to secure the island before evacuation and to do it in a much
more cheerful than I expected.
Commendation is due all of the men with special]
mention of Mr. Kapral and M/Sgt Pletsch for excellent leadership.
Declassified
pop DIR 5200.16
lassified
Deciass
pop DIR 5200.10