(a) The study of effects at ultra high altitudes eseential to the
design of effective anti-ICBM and other systems involving outer space,
including the warheads, the delivery means, countermeasures and
counter-countermeasures;
{b). Second generations of IRBM'‘s, ICBM's and Fleet Ballistic
Missiles designed to drastically reduce overall systems costs and
(c) Economical designs of warheads for highly mobile systems
for the support of battle groups and for air defense;
(d)
Clean weapons in the middle and lower range yields;
(e)
Weapons which combine absolute nuclear safing with safety
from predetonation,
With respect to Items {a) and (b) above, the facts are:
(a) That the USSR possesses a recognizedlong range missile
capability and that following the conclusion of the HARDTACKtest
program the United States will still not be fully assured of the design
of an effective anti-ICBM system to include adequate knowledge of
weapon effects at ultra high altitudes and the essential characteristics
of the nuclear warheads required.
{(b) Since the deterrent capability of U.S. long and medium range
missile systems is compromised by the Soviets! ability to adopt the
initiative, the retaliatory threat of these systems should be maintained
at the highest feasible level through further warhead development,
improved readiness and, if necessary, by greater dispersion and
larger numbers.
It is the Department's view that until these two requirements are
-3-
TOP-SECRET-
«
~
7“ s
F
‘
*
Mo Serer bean
Laps ort,
whe. x ian
In considering the inability of the United States to pursue Items (c),
(d) and (e) as listed above, it appears necessary to give adequate weight
Oe eae eer
United States should not enter into a test cessation agreement unless it
is a part of a broader agreement which offers very large compensating
advantages.
me
adequately and assuredly met through necessary test programs, the
+ gee
sae MAE
|
reaction times;