.littee early envisaged the requirements that the security
The Joint Proof-Te.
policy would demand of th~ .,oint Task Force. General Hull outlined these requirements
to the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Colonel Thomas J. Sands, USA, during the first week
of October 1947, and directed that the necessary plans be devised.
Lines of action open at this time to an unfriendly power, in order of their relative
probability, were estimated by J–2 to be as follows:
a. Reconnaissance: Observations in the operational area conducted by:
(1) Submarines with or without small landing parties.
(2) Surface vessels.
(3) Aircraft.
Such reconnaissance missions could be expected to attempt the collection of information
by visual observation, photography, or other methods of instrumentation and/or by the
theft of classified material.
b. Espionage: Injection into the Joint Task Force of agents with missions of visual
observation, photograph y, the theft or seizure of significant documents, fissionable materials or weapon components; interrogation of Task Force personnel by agents outside the
Joint Task Force operational area; and the accumulation of intelligence from gossip, personal letters and other sources.
c. Sabotage: Destruction or crippling of critical scientific apparatus or installations
by saboteurs; sinking of major Joint Task Force Seven ships by sabotage methods which
would delay indefinitely or force the abandonment of the costly and long-planned experimentation
d. Conventional methods of collecting intelligence: Monitoring of Task Force radio
communications; analysis of newspaper or other public media releases or comment dealing with Task Force operations; and monitoring of amateur radio stations, if any, in the
forward areas.
In accordance with this estimate of the situation, the first step in the implementation
of the security policy was the selection and screening of personnel who were to participate
in the operation. Personnel who were to have access to AEA Restricted Data were subjected to a comp~ete background investigation by the FBI, termed by the AEC as “Q” type
clearance, which consisted of a llle and fingerprint check by the FBI. No person was to be
permitted in the operational area who had neither type of clearance. This program had to
be conducted concurrently with the mounting of the operation. Since about 60 days were
required to complete a “Q” clearance, interim or temporary clearances of this type had
to be granted to commanders and key staff officers in order to permit the planning of the
operation to go forward.
A positive intelligence plan was necessary as a second step in the implementation of
the security policy. Initially, this plan was designed to provide a constant flow of information to the Task Force Commander on such subjects as Russia’s knowledge of the operation or the interest of satellite nations in the subject and the knowledge or interest of
any other foreign power relative to the operation. Following the limited disclosures to the
public in December, this plan was broadened by formal initiation of a collection request
which, through the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army, was transmitted
to all appropriate governmental intelligence agencies. Semi-monthly summations of infor74