Moreover, those who are charged with interpreting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should
be fully educated as to what its implication is on commanders in the field. One who knows
nothing about a commander’s duties and responsibilities can unwittingly pre\7ent the success of the task force, if he does not really appreciate the effect of a wrong, or an unsound
military interpretation on matters of security. For instance, a prohibition against cameras
in the area should state specifically what cameras. Such a prohibition should never be the
cause, or excuse, for arbitrarily removing an expensive camera installation from an instrument set up in an airplane. Certainly a camera used only to photograph a “radar scope”
does not involve restricted data under the Atomic Energy Act, in the same way it might if
used to photograph the explosion, or parts of the bomb.
lV.
Technical Data:
All services should have full and free access to all data affecting its military use immediately. It must be presumed that since they share in the conduct of the test, they must
share equally in the responsibility in getting the results, especially where these are of value
to their respective military services.
V. Requirements:
W%en the requirements of the services were submitted these were considered secondary to the interests of the Atomic Energy Commission. The effect of this was to prevent
the military from obtaining all that was requested. I believe that some of these have since
developed into very importint requirements. Tests conducted only at long intervals of time
must, of necessity, endure the burden of a great many requirements, or we will not derive
full value from them.
V1. Timely
Information:
When a test is to be conducted, it should be known to all the defense departments at
once, so there will be ample opportunity to fully and completely consider every possible defense requirement. This requires time for flexibility and intelligent consideration of all
possible use to which the test can be put.
VII.
Observers:
In my opinion, the limiting of observers was too restrictive. The services should be
fully educated on all possible use of atomic energy or the future of this science will remain
in the hands of a limited few. This will result in slowing down the practicable application
of one of the most important and far-reaching phases of our probable future life. Atomic
energy newis the intelligent evaluation of everyone, or it will remain a mystery. Being a
mystery, once it appears as a weapon in the hands of our enemy, there is likely to be a tendency to hysteria.
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