Subcommittee, consisting largely of SFO contractor personnel, made two major recommendations inthe interest of reduced security costs without weakening national se-~curity: (1) Recognition that no security is involved in approximate yield of nuclear
be aon
detonations in Nevada; and, (2) application of the reactor field's "black box" idea to
those items of nuclear weapons which are clearly of a military and not AEC nature.
A field classification board was established at Sandia in addition to the one at LASL.
Declassification
Declassification is necessarily highly centralized and is performed for SFO by
an Assistant Director, LASL, advised by Senior and Responsible Reviewers (the latter
at LASL and Sandia) and by field classification boards. The normal tendency to overclassify has been materially reduced and a continuing program to review classified
material for downgrading or declassification has been continued. Formal declassification was accomplished during the three years on 585 items from LASL and 16 from
Sandia.
Publication of "The Effects of Atomic Weapons" and release of information
in the Rosenberg-Greenglass cases opened a fairly large field of information which
could be considered for declassification.
Security
Considerable program stabilization was achieved while planning and activating
"crash" basis expansion. To provide coordinated service over awide geographic area,
security offices were established in New York and in Los Angeles. As of July 1953,
SFOO had security responsibility in 423 security facilities, 25 per cent of the entire
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AEC's facilities.
A key achievement was segregation of staff and operating functions,
with the Office of Security providing over-all direction and with SFOO Field Offices
tending more toward local administration and less toward operations. For instance,
installation guarding was being performed by contractor employees (or the Military)
at all points except Los Alamos. Particular SFOO emphasis was placed on continuous
review, evaluation, and coordination of security programs and measures throughout
SFO. Careful analysis and action made possible a reduction of more than 50 per cent
in ratio of guards to total Q-cleared work force at major SFO installations, the 1950
figure having been one to seven and the mid-1953 figure one to seventeen. Reductions
in size of limited access areas and institution of various personnel security safeguards
permitted a 3, 750 reduction in number of Q-clearances processed in fiscal 1953 as
compared with 1952.
Two permanent panels of Personnel Security Board members
were set up in 1950 to assist in administrative review of personnel clearance cases.
Document control measures were intensified.
Classified documents on hand June 30,
1953, totaled 53,000, 000 with unaccounted-for documentstotaling 840.
Information
j?
There was a heavy, continuing output of classified reports, primarily by LASL
ar
and Sandia, with efforts being made to prepare them in a form not containing critical
weapon data and so permitting wider classified distribution. LASL formed a Weapons
Test Report section to replace special groups previously organized for each test series
and to provide centralized and uniform handling, with 275 such reports issued prior to
mid-1953. In addition to the requirement for technical reports, Sandia also had a
heavy requirement for preparation of training manuals for the Military.ALGO
LASL and Sandia issued 493 formal, nonclassified reports on scientific and tech-
nological subjects during the period.
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There was a continuing flow of unclassified re-
search material, particularly from UCLA's medical school.
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