VII
muster, position, and fallout reports reducud the len:;th of these
frequently recurring messages over woice circuit.
o2 the flagship,
the primary tactical ad aninistrutivs voice cireuits torninated in
Flac :lot, um:er the control of the staff watch officer, sad were
irmediately accessible to the Task Group ‘ormsander.
Considersble use
of visual corrainicutions was made during the hours when the ships
remained in formation, on station outside the legoon.
However,
traffic on the task group Gf Comion became seriously backlogged.
ho meseaces of roubine precedence or below were passed for appraximately 48 houre, and priority treffic wes delayed for several houra,
16.
Comaunications for eubsejuent shots in ceneral followed
the pattern established during BR:¥O.
‘There was no necessity for
further pre-shot drills end rehearsals of tins broodcast and other
special alenaless the freaient sorties provided sufficient drill.
Activation of shot time cireuita was deferred ontil O70O on ainus
one day.
This shortened the periat from 70 to eppraximately 36 hours
when moat ships were forced to maintain a watch-in-two among comnaticators,
CUETISS, now the flagship, met all the comsmuniastion require-
ments imoosed by CTO 7.3, bat the nuxber of control lines between Kain
Camm and Radio IJ (4 audio smi 5 Cv) was 0 limiting factor in activating
any additional cireaite.
17.
& considerable decrease in treffic during the later shots
was evidemt.
In part this ws attributable to the teammrk within
the task group prior to these shots, ai to previous resolution of
problers and promilgation of directives.
AFWLIHO
re
(Originators were directed