X
—7(0—
likely to result from the operation of an international system for the suppression
of bomb production, since such a system would almost certainly not survive the
outbreak of a major war,
If such a system were in fact effective at the ovening
of hostilities, the situation resulting would be far more likely to fall under
(b) than under (a), unless the war were very short.
For the race to get the
bomb would not be an even one, and the side which got it first in quantity would
be under enormous temptation to use it before the opponent had it.
Of course,
it is more reasonable to assume that an international situation which had so
far deteriorated as to permit the outbreak of a major war would have long since
seen the collapse of whatever arrangements for bomb production control had
previously been imposed, unless the conflict were eeEE by an
exercise of sanctions for the violation of such ac
trol system,
Thus we see that a war in which atomic bombs are
ed is more likely to
occur if both sides have the bomb@ in quantity from the beginning than if neither
side has it at the outset or if only one side has ite?
occur?
But how likely is it to
Since the prime motive in refraining from using it would be fear of
retalitation, itis difficult to see why such a fear should be strong enough to
prevent the use of the bomb without being strong enough to prevent
of war in the first place,
the outbreak
In other words, the whole situation would argue a
kind of marginal behavior which is foreign to human nature,
The fact is that once hostilities broke out, the pressures to use the bomb
would swiftly reach unbearable proportions,
One side or the
other trould feel
that its relative position respecting ability to use the bomb might deteriorate
as the war progressed, and that if it failed to use the bomb while it had the
29. One can almost rule out too the possibility thet war would break out between
two great powers where both lkmew that only one of them had the bombs in quantity.
It is one of the old maxims of power politics that ctest une crime de faire la
guerre sans compter sur la supériorité, and certainly a monopoly of atomic bombs
woula be a sufficiently clear definition of superiority to dissuade the other
Side from accepting the gauge of war unless directly attacked,
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