‘
-63—
opportunities for achieving world security agreements of a worth-—while sort.
That is an important proviso and may become a markedly restraining one.
Some means of international protection for those states which cannot protect
themselves will remain as necessary in the future as it has been in the past 27
Upon the security of such states our own security must ultimately depend,
But only a great state which has taken the necessary steps to reduce its own
direct vulnerability to atomic bomb attack is in a position to offer the necessary
support.
Reducing vulnerability is at least one way of reducing temptation to
potential aggressors.
And if the technological realities make reduction of
vulnerability largely synonymous with preservation of striking power, that is a
fact which must be faced,
Under those circumstances any domestic measures which
effectively guaranteed such preservation of striking power under attack would
contribute to a more solid basis for the operation of an international security
ay
x
%
So
��
es
’
fo
Aryeh
system,
}
ee
It is necessary therefore to explore all conceivable situations where the
ageressor's fear of retaliation will be at a minimumand to seek to eliminate
them,
The first and most obvious such situation is that in which the aggressor
aT. The argument has been made that once the middle or small powers have atomic
bombs they will have restored to them the ability to resist effectively the
aggressions of their great power neighbors--an ability which otherwise has well-
nigh disappeared,
This is of course an interesting speculation on which no
final answor is forthcoming. It is true that a small power, while admitting that
it could not win a war against a great neighbor, could nevertheless threaten to
use the bomb as a penalizing instrument if it were invaded, But it is also true
that the greate-power aggressor could make counter threats conccrning its conduct
while occupying the country which had used atomic bombs against it. It seems to
this writer highly unlikely that a small power would dare threaten use of the
bomb against a great neighbor which was sure to overrun it quickly once hostilities
began, especially since such a threat could serve as a justification, if one
were needed, for the use of the bomb by the grceat-power aggressor,
LY